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(54) **Method for algorithm independent cryptographic key management**

Verfahren zur Algorithmus-unabhängigen Geheimübertragungsschlüsselverwaltung

Procédé d'administration de clé cryptographique indépendant de l'algorithme

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- **PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CARNAHAN CONFERENCE ON SECURITY TECHNOLOGY 4 October 1983, ZURICH (CH) pages 95 - 102 CHORLEY ET AL. 'THE DEFINITION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOL'**
- **1978 NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE RECORD vol. 2, 3 December 1978, NEW YORK pages 26.1.1 - 26.1.6 LENNON 'CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY DISTRIBUTION USING COMPOSITE KEYS'**

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## Description

### Field of the Invention

The present invention concerns an improved means and method for secure communication and, more particularly, secure communication between varying types of user equipments employing differing cryptographic algorithms and/or cipher keys.

### Background of the Invention

A broad variety of cryptographic techniques and corresponding apparatus have been developed to meet increasing needs for secure communications among civilian and military users. These needs are fostered by increasingly stringent security requirements for industrial, financial, government, police, subscriber media, and other commercial and civil endeavors wherein unauthorized data interception would cause harm to the public good or to private business interests.

Typical encrypted data includes computer-based records, telephone conversations and other voice data, telemetry, facsimile transmissions, earth-satellite and satellite-satellite communications from a variety of sources including the Global Positioning System, and subscriber information distribution systems. Motivations for encrypting data include improved signal to noise ratio by promoting a more even data mix (e.g., transmitting an encrypted, balanced mixture of "ones" and "zeroes" rather than an unbalanced, non-encrypted string of "ones" or "zeroes"), enforcement of subscription fees, privacy of privileged conversation, national security concerns, and maintenance of financial transaction integrity for both prevention of computer-based crimes and to provide convincing assurance of confidentiality and user authorization.

Improved sophistication in intelligence surveillance and code-breaking methods have motivated the creation of new ciphering algorithms and corresponding equipments. By way of example and not intended to be limiting, several classes of cryptographic methods currently in broad use include the Data Encryption Standard (DES), as described in Federal Information Processing Standards Publications FIPS 46-1, "Data Encryption Standard," and FIPS 81, "DES Modes of Operation," both published by the United States Department of Commerce.

An element common to these diverse cryptographic devices and algorithms is the need for authorized senders and receivers to share cipher key information of some form enabling encryption and subsequent decryption of the intended message.

A disadvantage of prior art public-key cryptographic systems for secure communications such as telephony is that public-key data encryption and decryption is a very slow process. Accordingly, public-key cryptography is often used to transmit small amounts of informa-

tion, such as a traffic key for a more rapid cryptographic technique, in a secure fashion over a public transmission medium, such as a radio channel or a telephone line.

Encryption methods for real-time bidirectional communication include a variety of ciphering techniques such as those disclosed in FIPS 46-1 and 81, supra, and other techniques developed by companies supplying such apparatus. These methods are capable of providing excellent data integrity provided that both parties have or have access to suitable traffic keys for data ciphering. Typically these methods operate on blocks of digital data formed from input data of varying digital or analog form.

Sometimes multiple communication channels must be used, as for example when more than a single sender and receiver are involved, either serially or in parallel. Frequently, not all users have identical equipment or identical cryptographic keys or algorithms. Under these circumstances, redundant equipments differing in cipher keys or cryptographic algorithms and devices may well be needed at each sending or receiving site. This results in increased communication equipment needs and expenses. Further, where the type of communications equipment must be mobile or portable, the power requirements, weight, and large size necessary to accommodate multiple, separate secure communications systems are unacceptable.

From the document in "Proceedings of the International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology", 4 October 1983, Zurich, pp95-102, by Chorley et al., entitled "The definition and implementation of a secure communications protocol", there is known a method for establishing a secure communications link between first and second terminals wherein the terminals follow the procedure including the steps of:

- selecting in at least one terminal a common key generation and ciphering method;
- exchanging a message containing user authentication information;
- exchanging a message for providing data to form traffic keys;
- exchanging a message for synchronizing secure communications; and
- initiating secure communication.

Even when a single communications terminal accommodates multiple ciphering techniques, user knowledge of the other party's capabilities and manual user selection of suitable secure communications apparatus may be required. This can compromise communications security by increasing user knowledge of the details of the security algorithm and hardware employed, by spreading of authorized user information over a broader number of individuals, and by increasing user involvement in the detailed arrangements required to initiate secure communication. This increases the risk of error

in effecting secure communications links.

What is needed is a means for rapid real-time secure communications which accommodates multiple ciphering algorithms and cipher keys in a single apparatus, so that authorized, self-synchronizing communications can be established and maintained between diverse parties. It is further desirable that the apparatus be compact, light weight and have low power requirements.

### Summary of the Invention

According to the present invention, a novel method for effecting cryptographic communication between diverse ciphering systems is disclosed.

The present invention provides a method for establishing a secure communications link between first and second terminals as claimed in claim 1.

The above and other features and advantages of the present invention will be better understood from the following detailed description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

### Brief Description of the Drawing

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a secure communication system using the public telephone system in accordance with the present invention;

FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a key management data base in accordance with the present invention;

FIG. 3 is an illustration of a portion of the message sequence for initiating secure communication in accordance with the present invention;

FIG. 4 is a flow chart illustrating the data rate and cipher algorithm matching process in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 5 is a flow chart illustrating further details of a portion of the message exchange of FIG. 3 for establishing secure communication in accordance with the preferred embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 6 illustrates a schematic example of a secure communications terminal in accordance with the preferred embodiment of the present invention; and  
FIG. 7 illustrates the assignment of bits representing key generating capabilities in a message exchanged between transmitting and receiving terminals in accordance with the preferred embodiment of the present invention.

### Description of the Preferred Embodiment

As used herein the words "encryption", "enciphering" and "encoding" mean conversion of a plain-text message to a secure message, while "decryption", "deciphering" and "decoding" refer to the inverse of this process.

FIG. 1 illustrates secure communication system 100, comprising telephone network 120, telephone lines 107, and secure communications terminals 103, 109, as for example, secure telephones. In operation, voice data are digitized in one of secure communications terminals 103, 109. As used herein, the words "telephone" or "communications terminal" are intended to include any device for transmitting information including but not limited to audio information, facsimile, video, computer data, graphic data and combinations thereof, and the words "voice" or "data" or "voice data" are intended to include these and all other types of transmissible information.

Input data are encrypted in terminal 103 or 109 and subsequently transmitted via telephone lines 107 and telephone network 120 to, for example, another of secure communications terminal 109 or 103, wherein the encryption and digitizing processes are reversed, providing plain-text data equivalent to the original input data. Alternative transmission media, such as radio links, packet-switched data networks, dedicated lines or other communications channels are usefully employed in lieu of telephone lines 107 and telephone network 120. Modems, which can be external or internal to secure communications terminals 103, 109, are conventionally employed for communicating digital data streams over telephone lines or other communications links.

The present invention overcomes the problems of the prior art by providing within one or both of terminals 103, 109 a means and method for encrypting and decrypting messages according to one of several possible protocols that both terminals can understand so that terminals of differing characteristics and protocols can talk to each other. In a preferred embodiment, the protocol selection is automatic and transparent to the user. A preferred hierarchy of protocols is desirably included. In this way the invented multi-protocol terminal can communicate with other non-identical terminals.

FIG. 2 is a schematic example of key management data base 210 within secure communications terminal 103 (and/or 109) wherein multiple ciphering keys and devices KG1-KGN are organized. KG1-KGN are devices which provide encryption/decryption of messages according to one of N predetermined algorithms using keys appropriate to the particular algorithm chosen. Control means 215 are coupled to the multiple ciphering keys and devices KG1-KGN by means of interconnections 220, allowing a particular ciphering algorithm to be selectively employed in accordance with control means 215. Each secure communication terminal 103, 109 can contain a pair of key management data bases 210, one dedicated to encrypting and transmitting information and the other dedicated to receiving and decrypting information. A single key management database 210 can also serve both functions and is preferred. Only one of the two (or more) communications terminals 103, 109 need have multiple ciphering keys and devices KG1-KGN. The other terminal need have only one of

those found in the multi-device terminal.

Before secure communications can begin, terminals 103, 109 must be initialized. According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention initialization proceeds in one of two modes, the manual key management mode or the public key management mode. The public key management mode avoids the inconvenience of physically transporting (e.g., hand carrying) a unique pair of cipher keys specific to the particular communication to the secure communications terminals.

FIG. 3 is an illustration of a portion of a message sequence for automatically initiating secure communication between terminals A and B (e.g., terminals 103, 109) in the public key mode in accordance with the present invention. As schematically illustrated in FIG. 3, the public key management mode involves exchange of four messages, identified as (i) Access Domain and Capabilities (AD&C) Message 211, (ii) Authentication Message (AM) 230, (iii) Random Component Message (RCM) 250, and (iv) Cryptographic Synchronization (CS) Message 270. Each of these messages is desirably of a predetermined length comprising a series of bytes. Each byte desirably contains information of a specific type (e.g., available encryption devices, modem type, et cetera) and the complete message is formed, for example, by concatenating the appropriate group of bytes to form the message.

Access Domain and Capabilities (AD&C) Message 211 in this case provides: choice of key management mode, choice of key generator (KG) algorithm selected, certification authority for the terminal, and any additional terminal capabilities (e.g., data rate). FIG. 4 is a flow chart illustrating method 200 by which AD&C Message 211 of FIG. 3 is used to establish data rate and cipher algorithm matching in accordance with the present invention.

Method 200 illustrated in FIG. 4 comprises the steps of exchanging Access Domain and Capabilities (AD&C) Messages in block 211, an iterative loop 213, 216, 217, including the steps of checking a next data rate 213, decision step 216 for determining if a suitable data rate has been identified, verifying whether or not all data rates have been checked 217, proceeding to loop 219, 221, 222 when decision step 216 locates a data rate match, or terminating communication 218 if all data rates have been checked without finding a match. Loop 219, 221, 222, includes the steps of checking a next cipher algorithm 219, decision step 221 for determining if a suitable cipher algorithm has been identified (i.e., one common to both terminals), and verifying 222 that all cipher algorithms have been checked, followed by a step of proceeding 224 when decision step 221 locates a cipher algorithm match, or terminating communication 218 if all cipher algorithms have been checked without finding a match.

By way of example and not intended to be limiting, consider the case where only two possible key generators designated KG1 and DES are included and the DES

key generator is given preferred status in the event that both KG1 and DES are common to the two terminals. In this situation method 200 concludes the AD&C message exchange with one of four possible outcomes: (i) if no match is found between the two terminals, the call is terminated; (ii) if only the KG1 mode is common to the two terminals, the KG1 key generator is used; (iii) if only the DES key generator is common to the two terminals, the DES key generator is used, and (iv) if both the DES and the KG1 modes are common to both terminals, the DES key generator is used. Similar outcomes apply for longer lists of key generator capabilities, with the highest common preferred status key generator being chosen for continued communication. The order of preference of key generators may be pre-programmed into the terminals or transmitted as part of the AD&C or other message.

The capabilities of the terminals are indicated by specific bytes or groups of (e.g., eight) bits, within an overall message. Specific bits of a specific byte are used to indicate a given capability according to a predetermined protocol. For example, the leading bit of the key generator capability byte can be chosen to represent a capability for a proprietary key generator, with the next bit chosen to represent a capability for a DES-type key generator. A similar convention can be employed for data rate capabilities, et cetera.

FIG. 5 is a flow chart illustrating the exchange of second, third, and fourth messages 230, 250, 270 of FIG. 3 to determine validity of terminal credentials, setting up traffic keys and synchronizing the encryption/decryption process. The following steps are performed in accordance with the present invention: Authentication Message (AM) exchange 230, Random Component Message (RCM) exchange 250, and Cryptographic Synchronization (CS) Message exchange 270. Verification (block 275) is also desirable for establishing secure communication (block 277).

FIG. 5 comprises loop 230, 233, 235, 237 including steps of Authentication Message (AM) exchange (block 230), verification (block 233) of AM exchange, AM decryption and public key extraction (block 235), AM verification (block 237) and termination of communications 218 if AM verification fails. These steps are followed by steps of random number generation (block 245), random number encryption using, for example, public key cryptography (block 247), and Random Component Message exchange (block 250) and traffic key generation (block 267), Cryptographic Synchronization message generation and transmission (block 270), data mode determination (block 273), cryptographic synchronization verification (block 275) and continuation of communication (block 277).

AM exchange (block 230) provides information identifying certified user authentication information, the certified user public key, and the certified information expiration date. This message is processed using public key cryptography to encrypt and decrypt the message

according to means well known in the art.

A random number is generated in each terminal (block 245) and sent to the other terminal after being encrypted, for example, using the public key received in the AM. Thus, each Random Component Message (RCM) exchanged (block 250) contains a random number, generated by the communications terminal originating the exchanged RCM. This random number should be of sufficient length to provide a traffic key for any of the key generators employed in the secure communications system. This first random number is also stored in the originating terminal and combined (block 267) with a second random number decrypted from a Random Component Message returned by the other terminal. The combined first and second random numbers form a third random number. Meanwhile, the same thing is happening in the other terminal wherein the received (first) random number is combined with the internally generated (second) random number to produce the same third random number. The third random number is used as a traffic key for the selected (block 221 of FIG. 4) key generator for both the terminals, and is loaded therein starting with the most significant bit. Any unused bits in the traffic key are discarded, allowing a single apparatus to generate varying traffic key lengths to accommodate the potentially differing requirements of a plurality of key generators within key management data base 210 (see FIG. 2). The first random number is encrypted (block 270) prior to incorporation into and exchange of RCM (block 250) by, for example, use of the certified user public key contained in the received Authentication Message (block 230). The same thing happens to the second random number coming from the other terminal. One method for combining the first and second random values (block 267) is modulo-two addition, readily implemented by exclusive-ORing the random numbers in a bit-wise fashion, as is well known in the art. However, other means and methods well known in the art for combining binary numbers may also be used.

Cryptographic Synchronization (CS) Message 270 delivers: traffic modality (voice, data, etc.) information, cryptographic information as required, and KG synch verification. A linear feedback shift register, or LFSR, (not shown) may be employed as a portion of the cryptographic apparatus. Linear feedback shift registers require a starting value or seed. The seed is an example of cryptographic information which may be required as a part of CS message 270. LFSR's are well known in the art.

A preferred method for KG synchronization verification is to transmit data which are an encrypted version of a known, or check, data pattern. These data are generated by loading an LFSR with a seed, synchronizing the transmit LFSR and transmit KG, and then encrypting the seed and the check pattern using the transmit LFSR and KG. When these received data are decrypted by the receiving secure communications terminal, the received

seed is loaded into the receive LFSR and the check data pattern is compared to a stored version thereof. A match between these is indicative of cryptographic synchronization of the secure communications terminals.

These steps thus allow secure communications terminals having multiple cryptographic capabilities to automatically (i) select an appropriate cryptographic mode from a predetermined hierarchy of cryptographic modes, (ii) select a common data rate, (iii) carry out appropriate terminal identification and user authorization, (iv) exchange traffic keys via a public key or another method, and (v) effect cryptographic communications synchronization and verification.

The foregoing steps are carried out in a fashion which is largely operator transparent, increasing system security and requiring less knowledge of detailed cryptographic procedures and methods of the operator.

In the manual key management mode, the call set-up sequence consists of the exchange of Access Domain and Capabilities (AD&C) Message 211 of FIGS. 3 and 4 and Cryptographic Synchronization (CS) message 270 of FIGS. 3 and 5.

Access Domain and Capabilities (AD&C) Message 211 of FIG. 4 provides information for determining which key management mode to employ, which KG algorithm to select, which traffic key within the manual key data base to use, and any additional terminal capabilities.

Cryptographic Synchronization message 270 exchange (FIG. 5) provides information specifying the traffic mode (voice, data, etc.), seed values for the linear feedback shift register and/or KG starting points, and also allows KG synchronization verification.

#### Example

The following is an example of the means and method of the present invention. FIG. 6 illustrates an example of secure communications terminal 600 analogous to terminal 103 (and/or 109) wherein modem 610 communicates with telephone line or other communications system 605 and is connected to microprocessor controller 620. Microprocessor controller 620 is coupled to key management data base 630 and to key generators KG1 identified as 633 and KG identified as 637 (e.g., DES), switch 640, and voice or data link 645. Switch 640 determines which of key generators 633, 637 is employed to connect voice or data link 645 to microprocessor controller 620, modem 610, and communications system 605.

FIG. 7 illustrates KG capabilities byte 710 and modem rate capabilities byte 720 of AD&C message 211 (FIGS. 3 and 4), showing modalities for key generation, data rate and format supported by a given secure communications terminal 103, 109 (FIG. 1). In these examples, the unused bits are marked "RES" and are included with the used bits to form the complete capabilities bytes. The highest priority bit used is the leftmost one not marked "RES". In KG capabilities byte 710, the high-

est priority key generator is thus DES with KG1 being the next highest priority key generator. Similarly, data rate priorities may range from 96D (highest) to 48V (lowest), in accordance with standard data rates which are well known in the art.

A first step is the generation of AD&C message 211 (see FIGS. 3 and 4), built up of bytes such as 710, 720 of FIG. 7, describing capabilities of the machine originating AD&C message 211. AD&C messages are then exchanged (block 211, FIG. 2) and passed to microprocessor controller 620, wherein they are parsed as in steps 213, 216, 217, 219, 221, 222, 224 to determine corresponding capabilities between the two secure communications terminals. If a failure to determine correspondence occurs, communication is terminated (block 218). Matching results in communications proceeding (block 224).

For the case where only two possible key generators designated KG1 and DES are considered, with the DES key generator being given preferred status in the event that both are common to the two terminals (as illustrated in byte 710 of FIG. 7), AD&C message exchange (block 211) concludes with one of four possible outcomes as described earlier.

The initial modem rate is established by the secure terminal which initiates the call. The modem rate can be changed to another modem rate which is common to both secure terminals.

Microprocessor controller 620 (FIG. 6) then sends a first Authentication Message (AM) and receives a second AM (block 230 of FIG. 5) via modem 610. The received AM is processed (blocks 235, 237) to decrypt a public key and to verify the AM. If the AM is not verified the processor can re-try a predetermined number of times and if there is still a failure, terminate communication as in block 218 of FIG. 5.

Microprocessor controller 620 then employs one of the key generators KG1-KGN from key management data base 630 (analogous to 210 of FIG. 2) to generate (block 245, FIG. 5) a random number which is encrypted (block 247) using the public key decrypted (block 235) from the received AM. The encrypted random number and other data are combined to form a random component message (RCM) which is exchanged (block 250) via modem 610 for an RCM from the remote (other) secure communications terminal. The random number obtained from the received RCM is combined with the random number generated (block 245) earlier to form a traffic key for the key generator determined from the AD&C Message. The random numbers can be combined by adding them using modulo two arithmetic, an operation realized, as for example, by means of exclusive-ORing two binary numbers.

The resultant (third) random number is loaded into the KG selected by the AD&C message exchange (block 211), beginning with the most significant bit.

Microprocessor controller 620 generates another random number used as a seed for the transmit linear

feedback shift register. A check pattern is encrypted and transmitted (block 270) as a portion of the CS message, which also contains seed(s) for the remote (other) terminal's receive LFSR and/or KG. The CS message (block 270) received from the remote terminal contains seeds to be used by the receive LFSR and/or KG of the first (originating) secure communications terminal. This is decrypted from the received CS message and is used to decrypt the received check pattern. A similar operation is being performed in the remote terminal. When the check pattern is properly decrypted (block 275) and verified against the stored data check pattern, secure communication of the desired message can proceed (block 277). In the event that decryption of the check pattern is not successful, the key generator is reloaded with a random number and CS message exchange (block 270) is re-tried.

In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, microprocessor controller 620 comprises two Type 6303 micro-controller chips and a Type DSP 56001 high speed digital signal processing chip manufactured by Motorola, Inc., of Phoenix, AZ. The first Type 6303 micro-controller handles all signal flow tasks, determining when each of the steps of FIGS. 4 and 5 occur, the second Type 6303 microprocessor chip determines the content of each individual message 211, 230, 250, 270, and the Type DSP 56001 chip performs numerically intensive computations associated with encryption and decryption of, for example, public key encoded data and other similarly computationally involved tasks. A preferred embodiment of the modem function is Type V.26, or alternatively, Type V.32. Modems of these types are sold by Universal Data Systems, a subsidiary of Motorola, Inc., located in Huntsville, AL. However, other modems or methods of communication can also be used.

Based on the foregoing description, it will be apparent to those of skill in the art that the present invention solves the problems and achieves the purposes set forth earlier, and has substantial advantages as pointed out herein, among other things, (1) allowing secure communication between differing types of secure data communications systems employing differing encryption algorithms, key variables and key variable lengths with a single apparatus containing multiple ciphering engines, (2) providing a predetermined hierarchy of algorithms, keys, communications modes, etc., for increased security, and (3) able to be transparent to the user. By providing these features in a single apparatus, the present invention minimizes power supply requirements and expense of equipment, and provides a compact form.

Another advantage of the present invention is that automation of secure information protocol and key variable exchange minimizes the need for detailed user knowledge of system operation. This simplifies operation of the secure communications terminal. Additionally, need for dissemination of information describing system operation is reduced, thus providing additional security by minimizing exposure of detailed system knowl-

edge.

## Claims

1. A method for establishing a secure communications link between first (103, A) and second (109, B) terminals, wherein the terminals (103, A, 109, B) follow a procedure including steps of:

exchanging (211) a first message containing information on encryption devices and communications modes available within the terminals (103, A, 109, B);

selecting (219, 221, 222) in at least one terminal (103, A, 109 or B) a common key generation and ciphering method;

exchanging (230) a second message containing user authentication information;

exchanging (250) a third message for providing data to form traffic keys;

exchanging (270) a fourth message for synchronizing secure communications; and initiating (277) secure communication, the method characterized in that it includes the steps of:

prior to said selecting (221) a common ciphering method by means of an automatic programmed hierarchy (218, 219, 221, 222, 224) of secure information interchange methods step, a step of exchanging a first message containing information on encryption devices and communications modes available within the terminal (103, A 109, B); and

including, in the selecting (219, 221, 222) in at least one terminal (103, A 109, B) a common key generation and ciphering method step, a step of selecting a common data rate.

2. The method claimed in claim 1 wherein said third exchanging step (250) further includes steps of:

generating (245) a first random number in the first terminal (103, A);

generating (245) a second random number in a second terminal (109, B);

exchanging (250) random numbers; and forming (267) in each terminals (103, A, 109, B), a third random number from the first and second random numbers to form a traffic key.

3. The method claimed in claim 2, wherein said forming step further includes a step of exclusive ORing.

4. The method claimed in claim 1, wherein said fourth exchanging step (270) further includes steps of:

encrypting a known data pattern using the in-

formation from the third exchanging step (250); transmitting the encrypted known data pattern; receiving an encrypted known data pattern; decrypting the received encrypted known data pattern using a traffic key derived from the third exchanging step (250); and comparing the decrypted received encrypted known data pattern to a stored known data pattern to determine agreement.

5. The method claimed in claim 4, wherein said decrypting step further includes a step of decrypting a random number for use as a linear feedback shift register seed.

6. The method claimed in claim 1, wherein said fourth exchanging step (270) further includes a step of generating an initial linear feedback shift register seed value.

## Patentansprüche

1. Verfahren zur Herstellung einer gesicherten Kommunikationsverbindung zwischen einem ersten (103, A) und einem zweiten (109, B) Endgerät, wobei die Endgeräte (103, A, 109, B) einer Prozedur folgen, die die Schritte umfaßt:

Austauschen (211) einer ersten Nachricht, die Information über Verschlüsselungseinrichtungen und Übertragungsmodi enthält, die innerhalb der Endgeräte (103, A, 109, B) zur Verfügung stehen;

Wählen (219, 221, 222) in wenigstens einem Endgerät (103, A, 109 oder B) eines gemeinsamen Schlüsselerzeugungs- und Verschlüsselungsverfahrens;

Austauschen (230) einer zweiten Nachricht, die Benutzer-Berechtigungsinformation enthält;

Austauschen (250) einer dritten Nachricht, die Daten bereitstellt, um Verkehrsschlüssel zu bilden;

Austauschen (270) einer vierten Nachricht zum Synchronisieren gesicherter Übertragungen und

Einleiten (277) der gesicherten Übertragung, wobei das Verfahren dadurch gekennzeichnet ist, daß es die Schritte umfaßt:

vor dem Schritt zum Wählen (221) eines gemeinsamen Verschlüsselungsverfahrens mittels einer automatischen programmierten Hier-

archie (218, 219, 221, 222, 224) von gesicherten Informationsaustauschverfahren, einen Schritt zum Austauschen einer ersten Nachricht, die Information über Verschlüsselungseinrichtungen und Übertragungsmodi enthält, die innerhalb des Endgerätes (103, A, 109, B) zur Verfügung stehen, und

Einschließen, in den Schritt zum Wählen (219, 221, 222) eines gemeinsamen Schlüsselerzeugungs- und Verschlüsselungsverfahrens in wenigstens einem Endgerät (103, A, 109, B), eines Schritts zum Wählen einer gemeinsamen Datengeschwindigkeit.

2. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, bei dem der dritte Austauschschritt (250) weiter die Schritte umfaßt:

Erzeugen (245) einer ersten Zufallszahl in dem ersten Endgerät (103, A);

Erzeugen (245) einer zweiten Zufallszahl in dem zweiten Endgerät (109, B);

Austauschen (250) der Zufallszahlen und

Bilden (267) in jedem Endgerät (103, A, 109, B) einer dritten Zufallszahl aus der ersten und zweiten Zufallszahl, um einen Verkehrsschlüssel zu bilden.

3. Verfahren nach Anspruch 2, bei dem der Bildungsschritt weiter einen Schritt zur Exklusiv-ODER-Verknüpfung umfaßt.

4. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, bei dem der vierte Austauschschritt (270) weiter die Schritte umfaßt:

Verschlüsseln eines bekannten Datenmusters unter Verwendung der Information von dem dritten Austauschschritt (250);

Senden des verschlüsselten bekannten Datenmusters;

Empfangen eines verschlüsselten bekannten Datenmusters;

Entschlüsseln des empfangenen, verschlüsselten bekannten Datenmusters unter Verwendung eines von dem dritten Austauschschritt (250) erlangten Verkehrsschlüssels und

Vergleichen des entschlüsselten, empfangenen, verschlüsselten bekannten Datenmusters mit einem gespeicherten bekannten Datenmuster, um Übereinstimmung festzustellen.

5. Verfahren nach Anspruch 4, bei dem der Entschlüsselungsschritt weiter einen Schritt zum Entschlüsseln einer Zufallszahl zur Verwendung als Saat für ein lineares Rückkopplungs-Schieberegister umfaßt.

6. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, bei dem der vierte Austauschschritt (270) weiter einen Schritt zum Erzeugen eines Anfangssaatwertes für ein lineares Rückkopplungs-Schieberegister umfaßt.

## Revendications

1. Procédé d'établissement d'une liaison de télécommunications sûres entre des premier (103, A), et second (109, B) terminaux, dans lequel les terminaux (103, A, 109, B) suivent une procédure incluant les étapes :

d'échange (211) d'un premier message contenant de l'information sur les dispositifs de cryptage et les modes de télécommunications disponibles dans les terminaux (103, A, 109, B) ; de choix (219, 221, 222), dans au moins un terminal (103, A, 109, ou B), d'un procédé de production de clé commune et de chiffrage ; d'échange (230) d'un deuxième message contenant l'information d'authentification d'utilisateur ; d'échange (250) d'un troisième message pour délivrer des données pour former des clés de trafic ; d'échange (270) d'un quatrième message pour synchroniser les télécommunications sûres ; et de lancement (277) d'une communication sûre, le procédé étant caractérisé en ce qu'il comprend les étapes : avant ladite étape de choix (221) d'un procédé de chiffrage commun au moyen d'une hiérarchie automatique programmée (218, 219, 221, 222, 224) de procédés d'échange d'information sûre, une étape d'échange d'un premier message contenant de l'information sur les dispositifs de cryptage et les modes de télécommunications disponibles dans le terminal (103, A, 109, B) ; et d'inclusion, dans l'étape de choix (219, 221, 222), dans au moins un terminal (103, A, 109, B), d'un procédé commun de production de clé et de chiffrage, d'une étape de sélection d'un débit de données commun.

2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel ladite troisième étape d'échange (250) comprend en outre les étapes :

de production (245) d'un premier nombre aléa-



toire dans le premier terminal (103, A) ;  
 de production (245) d'un deuxième nombre  
 aléatoire dans un second terminal (109, B) ;  
 d'échange (250) des nombres aléatoires ; et  
 de formation (267) dans chaque terminal (103, 5  
 A, 109, B), d'un troisième nombre aléatoire à  
 partir des premier et deuxième nombres aléa-  
 toires pour former une clé de trafic.

3. Procédé selon la revendication 2, dans lequel ladite 10  
 étape de formation comprend, en outre, une étape  
 d'application d'une fonction OU-EXCLUSIF.

4. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel ladite 15  
 quatrième étape d'échange (270) comprend, en  
 outre, les étapes :

de cryptage d'une combinaison de données  
 connue en utilisant l'information issue de la troi- 20  
 sième étape d'échange (250) ;  
 d'émission de la combinaison de données con-  
 nue cryptée ;  
 de réception d'une combinaison de données  
 connue cryptée ;  
 de décryptage de la combinaison de données 25  
 connue cryptée reçue en utilisant une clé de  
 trafic obtenue de la troisième étape d'échange  
 (250) ; et  
 de comparaison de la combinaison de données 30  
 connue cryptée reçue décryptées à une com-  
 binaison de données connue mémorisée, pour  
 déterminer une concordance.


5. Procédé selon la revendication 4, dans lequel ladite 35  
 étape de décryptage comprend, en outre, une éta-  
 pe de décryptage d'un nombre aléatoire pour utili-  
 sation comme semence d'un registre à décalage de  
 contre-réaction linéaire.

6. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel ladite 40  
 quatrième étape d'échange (270) comprend, en  
 outre, une étape de production d'une valeur initiale  
 de semence de registre à décalage de contre-réac-  
 tion linéaire.

45


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



**FIG. 1**

**FIG. 2**




**FIG. 3**






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**FIG. 4**

**FIG. 5**



**FIG. 6**

**FIG. 7**

